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WITNESS-SPOUSE ALONE MAY EXERCISE SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
In Trammel v. United States' the Supreme Court modified the tradi-
tional common-law privilege2 permitting the accused to render his
spouse completely incompetent to testify in federal criminal cases.
Police indicted Otis Trammel and two others3 for importation and
conspiracy to import heroin.4 The Government named defendant's
wife as an unindicted co-conspirator 5 and granted her use immunity in
exchange for her testimony at trial.6 Asserting the testimonial privi-
lege, Trammel moved to disqualify his wife from testifying against
him.7 The trial court denied the motion' and permitted defendant's
wife to testify to any act she observed during the marriage and to any
communication made in the presence of third parties.9 The trial court
convicted Trammel on both counts. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed. 10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari I and held: A witness-
spouse alone may refuse to testify adversely and may neither be com-
1. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
2. At issue in Trammel is the testimonial privilege, rather than other evidentiary privileges
such as the marital communications privilege or the attorney-client privilege. The testimonial
privilege is a competency doctrine that permits the holder of the privilege to prevent a witness
from taking the stand. This complete disqualification has a markedly greater effect than other
evidentiary privileges, which may bar specific testimony, but do not completely prevent the wit-
ness from testifying. See notes 7, 9, 32 infra and accompanying text.
3. 445 U.S. 40, 42 (1980).
4. Defendants were indicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a), 963 (1976).
5. 445 U.S. at 42.
6. Id The Government advised Mrs. Trammel that if she cooperated it might charge her
with a misdemeanor. In fact, the Government did not prosecute her. Brief for Respondent at 4
n.2, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
7. 445 U.S. at 42. In Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933), the Supreme Court permit-
ted the spouse of a defendant to testify in his behalf. Funk thereby abolished absolute testimonial
disqualification in the federal courts, changing the rule into a privilege of disqualification. Al-
though Funk allowed favorable spousal testimony, it did not affect the rule preventing one spouse
from testifying adversely against the other.
8. See 445 U.S. at 43.
9. The holding in Trammel applies only to the testimonial privilege. The confidential mari-
tal communications privilege, recognized in Wolfie v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), and Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951), was not at issue. See 445 U.S. at 45 n.5.
10. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that the witness-wife
was an unindicted co-conspirator who had been granted immunity and held that the grant over-
came the testimonial privilege as well as the privilege against self-incrimination.
11. 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 2] SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
pelled nor foreclosed from testifying. 12
The testimonial privilege13 is a common-law doctrine 4 that enables
a criminal defendant to disqualify his spouse from testifying. 5 A de-
fendant could invoke the privilege' 6 regardless of the nature or content
of the testimony if the spouses were validly married at the time of the
criminal proceeding.' 7 Courts justified the testimonial privilege as nec-
essary to protect marital harmony and family peace. 8
The testimonial privilege is an evidentiary rule founded in policy; it
is not a constitutional right.' 9 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence20 provides that federal courts must develop common-law rules of
12. 445 U.S. at 53.
13. The testimonial privilege is also referred to as the privilege against anti-marital facts or
the marital privilege.
14. See generaly Comment, Questioning The Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy In a
Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REv. 307 (1976). Four marital privileges developed from the common
law: (1) The incompetency of one spouse to be a witness against the other; (2) the privilege of one
spouse not to testify against the other, (3) the privilege of one spouse to prevent incriminating
testimony from the other, and (4) the general privilege against disclosure of confidential commu-
nications between husband and wife. Id at 307.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir.
1975); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 839 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); In re
Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032, 1045 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Moorman, 358 F.2d 31, 33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 866 (1966);
Wilkerson v. United States, 342 F.2d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 1965).
16. Privileges are evidentiary laws created to foster or effect desirable social policies and
allow exclusion of evidence from judicial proceedings. A court may exclude privileged testimony
regardless of its probative value. See Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy, and Prerogatives: A Critical
Examination of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence as They.Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF.
L. REV. 1353, 1358 (1973).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 969
(1979); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McElrath, 377
F.2d 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
Death or divorce terminates the privilege. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954);
United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077,
1079 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 838 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1033 (1975).
18. Courts point out that admission of adverse spousal testimony may disrupt marital har-
mony or family peace. See, eg., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-79 (1958); United
States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally 8 J.
WIOMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 2227-2228 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
19. Eg., United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1978); In re September,
435 F. Supp. 538, 545 (N.D. Ind. 1977); Young v. Oklahoma, 428 F. Supp. 288, 294 (W.D. Okla.
1976); United States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533, 536 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
20. FED. R. EvID. 501 provides in pertinent part:
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privilege on a case-by-case basis2 "in light of reason and experi-
ence."
2 2
In Hawkins v. United States23 the Supreme Court first considered the
validity of a criminal defendant's testimonial privilege. The Court held
the spouse's testimony inadmissible, choosing to preserve the common-
law rule that "bars the testimony of one spouse against the other unless
both consent."'24 The Court rejected the Government's argument that
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory au-
thority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
By enacting Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress rejected Proposed Rule 505,
56 F.R.D. 183, 244-45 (1972), promulgated by the Supreme Court. Proposed Rule 505 would have
codified the right of an accused in a criminal trial to prevent his spouse from testifying against
him. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505 provided:
(a) General rule of privilege. An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to
prevent his spouse from testifying against him.
(b) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the accused or by
the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do so is presumed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in which one
spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other or of a child of
either, or with a crime against the person or property of a third person committed in the
course of committing a crime against the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the
marriage or (3) in proceedings in which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for
prostitution or other immoral purpose in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328, with transporting
a female in interstate commerce for immoral purposes or other offense in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424, or with violation of other similar statutes.
Rule 505 was eliminated by a congressional committee when it became apparent that no agree-
ment was likely to be possible as to the content of specific privilege rules. Because the inability to
agree threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire rules package, the determination was
made that the specific privilege rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule
(rule 501) substituted. Thus, Congress left the law in its current condition, allowing the courts to
develop it by utilizing the principles of the common law. S. REP. No. 1277, H. R. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7053.
21. Congress intended testimonial privileges to develop through adjudication of particular
cases. Congressman Hungate, principal sponsor of the Rules of Evidence in the House, addressed
this point during floor debate:
Rule 501 is not intended to freeze the law of privilege as it now exists. The phrase
"governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in light of reason and experience," is intended to provide the courts
with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.
120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974).
22. Wolle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934) (expression first used by Supreme Court). FED.
R. CRiM. P. 26 codified the language in Woffe and governed the admissibility of evidence in
federal courts, including the application of common-law privileges, until Congress enacted FED.
R. EVID. 501. See note 20 supra.
23. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
24. Id at 78. See also Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); Funk v. United States,
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 2] SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
the witness-spouse should have the privilege to testify independent of
the defendant's control.25 Justice Black 26 made no attempt to balance
the possible consequences of adverse testimony against the loss to soci-
ety caused by excluding relevant evidence.2 Instead he emphasized a
strong concern for the preservation of marital harmony.28 The Court
did not preclude future modification based on "reason and experi-
ence," 29 but suggested little room for change.3"
Courts, legislators, and commentators have criticized the Hawkins
rule as an impediment to the performance of justice.3 There is disa-
290 U.S. 371 (1933); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892); United States v. Mitchell, 137
F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
25. 358 U.S. at 77-79. The Court believed that "the law should not force or encourage testi-
mony which might alienate husband and wife or further inflame existing domestic differences."
id at 79.
26. Justice Black wrote on behalf of a majority of eight. In his first opinion as a member of
the Court, Justice Stewart concurred, asserting that "reason and experience" require "that we do
more than indulge in mere assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this
ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquility." Id at 81-82 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. The Court only casually acknowledged this problem, stating that "[o]f course, cases can
be pointed out in which this exclusionary rule has worked apparent injustice." Id at 78. See
Note, The Husband- fWe Testimonial Privilege in the Federal Courts, 59 B.U.L. REv. 894, 900 &
nn.51-53 (1979).
28. 358 U.S. at 77. The Court stated:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband against wife
in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief that such a policy is necessary to
foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife, and children, but for the
benefit of the public as well. Such a belief has never been unreasonable and is not now.
id
29. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
30. 358 U.S. at 78. See United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Note, supra note 27, at 900; Note, Evidence.
Competency of Wfe to Give Adverse Testimony Against Husband, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 351, 355 (1959);
Note, Evidence- Witnesses-.bility of One Spouse to Tesiffy Against the Other in Federal Criminal
Proceedings, 12 VAND. L. REV. 947, 949 (1959).
31. See United States v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966
(1980); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974);
C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 at 145-46 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. Wio-
MORE, supra note 18, § 2228 at 217-22; Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in Calfor
nia, 19 CALIF. L. REV. 390, 408 (1931); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929); notes 33-35 infra and accompanying
text.
Justice Stewart is also an outspoken critic. Although concurring in the judgment on the ground
that the present case did not present an appropriate opportunity to modify the privilege, he stated:
Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing
of justice. When such a rule is the product of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is
universally criticized by scholars, and has been qualified or abandoned in many jurisdic-
tions, it should receive the most careful scrutiny.
Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. at 81.
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greement as a policy matter, however, whether the rule strikes the
proper balance between the' competing societal interests of preserving
family harmony and the need for presentation of relevant evidence.32
Many state legislatures have failed to follow the Supreme Court's
lead in Hawkins, vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse33 or abol-
ishing the privilege altogether.34 The trend in state law since the 1958
Hawkins decision deprives the accused of the ability to bar adverse
spousal testimony.
32. Privileges such as priest-penitent, attorney-client, and physician-patient limit protection
to communications made in trust. The testimonial privilege, on the other hand, permits the ac-
cused to exclude all adverse testimony. For Trammel's discussion of this issue, see 445 U.S. at 51.
33. Id at 48 n.9. Nine states entitle the witness-spouse alone to assert a privilege against
adverse spousal testimony. See ALA. CODE § 21-227 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 970-973 (Deer-
ing 1966 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (West. Cum. Supp. 1979); GA. CODE
ANN. § 38-1604 (1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.210 (Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:461 (West 1967); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101, -106 (1974); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-17-10 (1970).
In 1901 Congress enacted a rule of evidence for the District of Columbia that made husband
and wife "competent but not compellable to testify for or against each other," except as to confi-
dential communications. This provision, which vests the privilege against adverse spousal testi-
mony in the witness-spouse, remains in effect. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (1973).
In 1965 California took the privilege from the defendant-spouse and vested it in the witness-
spouse, accepting a study commission recommendation that the "latter [was] more likely than the
former to determine whether or not to claim the privilege on the basis of the probable effect on the
marital relationship." See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 970-973 (Deering 1966 & Supp. 1981); 1 CALIF. L.
REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO THE MARITAL "FOR OR
AGAINsT" TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE F-5 (1956). See also 6 CALIF. L. REVISION COMM'N, TENTA-
TIVE PRIVILEGES RECOMMENDATIONS-RULE 27.5 at 243-44 (1964).
34. 445 U.S. at 48 n.9. Seventeen states have abolished the privilege in criminal cases. See
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2231 (Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, Rules 501, 504
(Cum. Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.501, .504
(West. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-14-5 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-407, -428 (1976); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 16, § 53 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.27 (1974); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.10
(McKinney 1971); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §§ 4502, 4512 (McKinney 1963); N.D. CENT. CODE,
N.D. R. EVID., 501, 504 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2103, 2501, 2504 (West 1980);
S.C. CODE § 19-11-30 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-1, -12 to -15 (1979); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-24-4 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 905.01, .05
(West 1975).
35. When the Court decided Hawkins in 1958, 31 jurisdictions allowed an accused to prevent
adverse spousal testimony. 358 U.S. at 81. The number dropped to 24 in 1980. 445 U.S. at 48.
Eight states provide that one spouse is incompetent to testify against the other in a criminal
proceeding. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 621-18 (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE § 622.7 (1950); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-5 (Cum. Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Cum. Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2945.42 (Page Cum. Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 5913, 5915 (Purdon Supp.
1980); TEx. CODE CIM. PRO. ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1973); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-104 (1977).
Sixteen states provide a privilege against adverse spousal testimony and vest the privilege in
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Legal scholars and commentators prefer the witness-spouse rule for
four reasons.36  First, the willingness of the witness-spouse to testify
adversely may indicate the degree to which marital harmony exists and
merits protection.37 Second, the witness-spouse is in a better position to
know if adverse testimony will be harmful to the marriage.38 Third,
more witness-spouses will testify and provide relevant evidence at trial
if the witness-spouse, rather than the accused, has the privilege.39 Fi-
nally, recognition of the witness-spouse rule will be uniform through-
out the federal judicial system.40
Following Hawkins, federal courts declined to consider the possibil-
ity of adopting a witness-spouse rule.4 1 Some courts adhered to Haw-
kins,42 while others limited the accused's privilege by carving out
exceptions to the rule43 or refusing to apply it for policy reasons.44
both spouses or in the defendant-spouse alone. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 26(b)(2) (Supp. 1968); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 9-203 (1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162
(1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. REV. STAT. § 546.260 (1978);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 46-16-212 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 49.295 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-6 (1978); OR.
REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VA. CODE § 19.2-271.2 (Cum.
Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 (1966).
36. See Reutlinger, supra note 16, at 1384-85; Note, supra note 27, at 917-19; Comment, The
Husband- Wife Evidentiary Privileges: The Power of the Federal Courts to Seek a Rational Solution,
17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 107 (1972); Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in
Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern
Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359 (1952); 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 74 (1961).
37. Brief for Respondent at 19, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (citing C. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 31, § 66 at 145 (2d ed. 1972)); Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Law of Privileges, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1287, 1336 (1969).
38. Note, supra note 27, at 918. See Reutlinger, supra note 16, at 1384; Comment, Marital
Privileges and the Right to Testify, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 196, 199 (1966).
39. See Reutlinger, supra note 16, at 1304; Note, supra note 27, at 917-18; Comment, supra
note 14, at 318.
40. Note, supra note 27, at 917-18. This assumes that federal courts will honor the privilege
whenever properly claimed by the witness. If exercise of the privilege is not subject to the judge's
discretion, but is instead applied uniformly and without exception, inconsistencies among the cir-
cuit courts of appeal will be avoided. See notes 42-44 infra and accompanying text.
41. Note, supra note 27, at 918.
42. United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d
752 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Fisher,
518 F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1945); In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.
1974); United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Moorman, 358 F.2d
31 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 866 (1966); Wilkerson v. United States, 342 F.2d 807 (8th Cir.
1965).
43. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1977) (exception to testimonial
privilege exists in prosecution of crimes committed by one spouse against the other or against the
children of either, and in action by one of the spouses against an outsider for an intentional injury
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss2/9
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A recognized exception to the testimonial privilege arises when
spouses are jointly involved in a criminal enterprise.45 This exception
rests on several grounds: it is unlikely that spousal testimony will affect
marital harmony when both husband and wife are parties to a crime;4 6
the need for evidence outweighs the possibility that the policy of the
privilege will be advanced;47 and the goal of preserving the family does
not justify guaranteeing aid to a criminal from his spouse without fear
that she will later be an adverse witness.4 8 As stated by the Seventh
to the marital relation); United States v. Smith, 533 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1976) (privilege
unavailable when one spouse commits offense against the other). Accord, United States v. Allery,
526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975). See Grulkey v. United States, 394 F.2d 244, 245-46 (8th Cir.
1968) (exception exists when wife is victim of alleged criminal act of husband); Herman v. United
States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971 (1956) (privilege inapplicable
when wife claims injury of physical or moral nature, or when husband's crime affects wife's prop-
erty).
44. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820
(1978) (policy of full enforcement of federal tax laws outweighed claim of privilege when marriage
would not be harmed by admission of testimony); United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756
(5th Cir. 1977) (when marriage no longer viable, traditional policy reasons for privilege non-
existent and privilege not applied); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (8th Cir. 1975)
(policy of preserving family harmony cannot be served in cases involving child abuse); United
States v. Fisher, 518 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975) (purpose of privi-
lege will not be served when court believed marriage was beyond reconciliation); In re Snoonian,
502 F.2d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1974) (privilege serves no purpose when testimony of husband poses
no threat of prosecution against wife).
45. See United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1978)
(extrajudicial statements of husband or wife made in furtherance of conspiracy admissible); Ryan
v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) (spouses must
answer interrogatories concerning tax evasion over claim of marital privilege); United States v.
Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968) (extrajudicial statement of
husband admissible when spouses accused of defrauding the government by falsifying income tax
returns); United States v. Owens, 424 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (wife permitted to testify
against husband when both involved in criminal offense).
46. United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1364 (7th Cir. 1972) (criminal conviction of
husband for aiding and abetting wife in tax evasion). Accord, Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d
531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978); United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974). See United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968) (Government testimony on husband's statement at trial
provided sufficient "buffer" so as not to endanger domestic peace). But see Ivey v. United States,
344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965) (admission of wife's out-of-court statement against husband held
reversible error).
47. Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978)
(when spouses married for 40 years, admitting testimony on failure to answer interrogatories by
the Internal Revenue Commissioner held not likely to adversely affect marriage). See also United
States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
48. United States v. Van Drumen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974)
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Circuit Court of Appeals, the Hawkins rule "should be limited to cases
where a spouse who is neither a victim nor a participant observes evi-
dence of the other spouse's crime. 4 9
In Trammel v. United States5" the Supreme Court acknowledged the
erosion of the Hawkins rationale' and reexamined the rule.52 Writing
for the majority, Chief Justice Burger considered "whether the privi-
lege against adverse spousal testimony promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence in the administra-
tion of criminal justice."53 He observed that the Hawkins privilege was
broader than other testimonial privileges, permitting an accused to ex-
clude all spousal evidence of criminal acts and communications made
in the presence of third parties. 4 Such a rule may frustrate justice
rather than promote family peace. 5 Additionally, vesting the privilege
in the accused could jeopardize the marital relationship. 6
Chief Justice Burger thus reasoned that when one spouse voluntarily
testifies against the other in a criminal proceeding, little marital har-
mony may remain for the Hawkins privilege to preserve. 7 Finding the
Hawkins rule inadequate, the Court declared that the witness-spouse
alone should have the privilege to refuse to testify adversely. 8 Chief
Justice Burger concluded that the witness-spouse rule furthers the pub-
(husband indicted for illegal transportation of aliens, one of whom he subsequently married; testi-
mony of wife against him at trial held properly admitted). See Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d
531,544 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978). See also 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 332, 339-45 (1827) (calling the privilege a license to indulge in crime and
stating that the privilege could be used to turn a man's home into a shelter for thieves).
49. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1091 (1974).
Accord, Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
50. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
51. The Court made special note of the trend in state law. See notes 33-35 supra and accom-
panying text.
52. 445 U.S. at 47-53.
53. Id at 51.
54. Id at 51-52. See notes 2, 32 supra.
55. 445 U.S. at 52.
56. Id The Court asserted that the Government would not offer a wife immunity and lenient
treatment if her husband could prevent her from testifying. If both spouses were implicated, and
the husband invoked his testimonial privilege, he could effectively escape justice at his wife's
expense.
57. Id
58. Id at 53. The Court apparently ignored the Government's alternative argument that it
recognize an exception to the Hawkins rule when the spouses are jointly involved in the criminal
activity. See Brief for Respondent at 8-16, 25-29, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
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lic interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening law enforce-
ment needs.59
Justice Stewart, concurring, criticized the Court for rejecting Haw-
kins based solely on a change in "reason and experience. ' 60 He found
the witness-spouse rule superior, but was unwilling to join an opinion
that neglected to detail the Court's sudden change in policy.
61
By modifying the Hawkins rule, the Trammel Court sought to strike
the appropriate balance between the competing interests of preserving
marital harmony and securing accurate resolution of judicial proceed-
ings.62 The witness-spouse rule most effectively achieves this balance. 63
Because the Court failed to address several key issues, however, it is
unclear whether Trammel will lead to favorable development of the
testimonial privilege.
First, the Court focused on the deficiencies of Hawkins rather than
emphasizing the virtues of the witness-spouse rule. The Court intended
the new rule to promote marital harmony, increase admissibility of
relevant evidence, and add uniformity to a privilege that has failed to
accomplish these objectives.' Chief Justice Burger did not, however,
provide guidance on the proper balance between the competing societal
interests. The opinion fails to indicate whether courts will have discre-
tion in applying the rule65 or whether courts will permit exceptions to
facilitate the production of evidence.66 Only if the privilege applies
uniformly and without exception will inconsistencies disappear.
Second, the Court failed to apply the witness-spouse rule to the
Trammel facts. The record indicates that Mrs. Trammel testified vol-
59. 445 U.S. at 53.
60. Id at 53-54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61. Justice Stewart indicated that he had found the witness-spouse rule acceptable when the
Government first urged its acceptance in Hawkins. He found the Court's sudden turnabout puz-
zling. "inhere is reason to believe that today's opinion of the Court will be of greater interest to
students of human psychology than to students of law." Id at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted).
62. Id at 47-53.
63. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
64. Id See Reutlinger, supra note 16, at 1384-85; Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify
Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Commu-
nications: Modern Trend, supra note 36, at 375.
65. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
66. If courts allow exceptions to the witness-spouse rule, further questions arise. Will courts
be permitted to inquire into the state of the marriage to determine if there is, in fact, a valid
marriage to protect? If so, what standards will be utilized to conduct this inquiry?
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untarily,67 implying three possibilities: (1) The marital relationship
was not worth preserving; (2) the marriage would ultimately benefit
from truthful testimony; and (3) the fear of prosecution and promises
of leniency prompted her appearance.68
If the witness-spouse does not participate in the criminal activity, the
decision to testify must rest on the first or second rationale. The court
may then assume that the spouse's testimony will not upset marital har-
mony.69 When the witness-spouse is implicated but not named a de-
fendant,7" however, the prosecution may strain the marital relationship
by promising leniency in return for the spouse's testimony.7' The
spouse may testify in an attempt to save herself at the accused's ex-
pense.72  Under these circumstances, it would be impossible to deter-
mine whether marital harmony exists or whether the policy of the
testimonial privilege is being subverted.73
The witness-spouse rule will adequately protect the marital relation-
ship in a majority of cases. 74 The Trammel decision is nevertheless dif-
ficult to administer when both spouses are involved.75 Precedent exists
67. 445 U.S. at 53. The Court stated that "[h]ere, petitioner's spouse chose to testify against
him. That she did so after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment does not
render her testimony involuntary." Id The Court referred to Mrs. Trammel's so-called voluntary
testimony to vitiate any criticism similar to Justice Stewart's concurrence in Hawkins. See 358
U.S. at 82-83 (Stewart, J., concurring).
68. See generally Reutlinger, supra note 16, at 1384-85.
69. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
70. Competency of spouses to testify against each other as co-defendants is not at issue. See
United States v. Hicks, 420 F. Supp. 533 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Competency of a husband or wife as a
witness for or against a co-offender or a spouse is also distinguishable. See generall, Annot., 90
A.L.R.2d 648 (1963).
71. N.Y.LJ., April 18, 1980, at 28, col. 1.
72. 358 U.S. at 83 (Stewart, J., concurring); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1 505[04] at 505-15 (1979).
73. This was the principal reason given in a memorandum by Edward W. Cleary, Reporter
for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, for rejecting the suggestion by the
Department of Justice that the witness-spouse be the sole holder of the privilege. Rules of Evi-
dence." Hearings on Proposed Rules ofEvidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1973). The deci-
sion to testify could still be voluntary, however, even if a witness weighed an interest in securing
lenient treatment in return for testimony against any concern for the marriage. See Brief for
Respondent at 21-22 & n.21, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
74. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
75. This suggests that Trammel was an inappropriate case to modify the common-law testi-
monial privilege. For similar reasons, Justice Stewart expressed the same view in Hawkins. See
358 U.S. at 82-83 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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for establishing a co-conspirator exception to resolve this problem;76
whether the Court will recognize any exception to the witness-spouse
rule remains a matter of conjecture."
The decision to modify the outdated Hawkins rule by vesting the
testimonial privilege in the witness-spouse is commendable. The Tram-
mel opinion unfortunately fails to provide needed insight into the diffi-
cult task of balancing the public interest in marital harmony without
burdening law enforcement needs.
76. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text. Co-conspirator exceptions imply that
marriages between criminals are unworthy of protection. If the Court had chosen to adopt the
witness-spouse rule, and at the same time adopted a co-conspirator exception, Mrs. Trammel
would not have had the privilege to refuse to testify against her husband.
77. See Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960) (Court first recognizes exception to Haw-
k ns rule).
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